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INTRODUCTION 
The  objeain: of tbb  pcpet is to hv&@c  the 
oompnitiw:  mxjitiens  in  rhe  Tukioh  baalcin~ 
inbuy  ow  tha:  @od  bewcm 1983 .od 1996 by 
appiyitq a rrw mahod pravously applied  to th: 
ility  of  the  Twkkb 
tbatadly~~~~~W~~a~oo&Tkaa.iatbg 
equil~tbcytvillsanzeo~profi~s 
ad  there mill he  m wry. There have heen few applications of the contestable 
markets theory to  the  banking. Studies by  Sharer 
(IVXI, 1982, and  1994). Nathan and Neave (1989). 
and  Molyneux et al. (1994 and 1996) are the most 
important  among  others.  They  employed  tests 
developed by Rosse and  Panzar (1977) and Panzar 
and  Rosse  (1987)  to  cxamine  competitive 
conditions  of  the  banking  industry  in  the  U.S.. 
Canada.  Europe.  and  Japan.  Shaffer  (1981  and 
1982) and  Nathan and  Neave  (1989) found some 
evidence  that  the  U.S.  and  Canadian  banking 
markets exhibit characteristics of contestability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section discusses structure and deregulation in 
the Turkish financial system. Section 3 presents the 
Rosse-Panzar  Model.  Section  4  discusses  recent 
literature. In  section 5, we discuss the econometric 
specification and the data as well as the empirical 
results.  The  final  section  draws  the  main 
conclusion. 
OVERVIEW OF BANKING 
ENVIRONMENT IN TURKEY 
In  the  1970s.  the  Turkish  banking  was a  closed 
system, heavily regulated in  terms of market entry. 
interest  rates, and  exchange rates,  protected  from 
external competition. conservative with  respect  to 
innovations.  and  controlled  by  the  large  state- 
owned  banks.  Since  interest  rates  were  highly 
regulated, banks were able to obtain their primary 
input,  deposits,  at  a  very  low  cost.  Furthermore, 
international  capital  movements  and  foreign 
exchange operations were subject to tight controls. 
To increase the efficiency and competition of the 
financial  system,  the  Turkish  Government 
announced  the  liberalization  program  in  January 
1980. One  of the  primary  goals  of the  financial 
liherali7ation prngram was to increase competition 
in  the hanking sector by eliminating restrictions on 
market entry,  interest rates on  loans and  deposits. 
and  exchange  rates.  The  first  important  step  to 
increase competition in  the market began  with  the 
elimination  of  ceiling  on  interest  rates  and  the 
introduction of certificates of deposits (CDs) in July 
1980.  New  foreign  and  national  private  banks 
started  to enter the market, and severe competition 
occurred  among  banks  immediately  aAer  the 
elimination  of  restrictions  on  intercst  rates  and 
market  entry. The  number  of  banks  operating in 
Turkey increased from 43 in 1980 to 69 in 1996 of 
which  20  were  foreign  banks.  There  were  also 
several  exits  from  the  industry due  to  financial 
crash both in  1982 and 1994. Other developments 
73 
in  the financial system also promoted competition 
in  the  banking  market:  In  1984, Turkish  citirens 
were allowed to hold foreign exchange deposits in 
banks.  In  1985.  the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange was 
reopened.  It  became  operational  in  1986.  The 
Central  Hank  established  an  Interbank  Money 
Market in  1986. Foreign exchange operations and 
intemational  capital  movements  were  liberalized 
entirely and the Turkish lira became convertible in 
1989. In  1990.  hanks  became completely free  to 
determine their exchange rates. 
The analyzed period witnessed rapid technological 
change  in  the  production  of  financial  services 
(computerizing banking operations, ATMs, recently 
PC  hanking  etc.).  The  banking  system  also 
introduced new financial instruments in  this period 
including repos (repurchasing agreements), maps. 
forwards. futures, credit cards, and consumer loans 
among the others. 
Table  I  illustrates  the  structural  changes  in  the 
Turkish  banking  industry and reports the five-firm 
market  concentration ratios  with  respect  to  total 
assets and deposits, number of hanks operating in 
the market. total  assets, total loans, total deposits, 
and total  assets-GNP ratio over the yean between 
1983  and  1996.  Although  the  five-firm 
concentration ratio with respect to total a5sets has 
slowly declined since 1980.  it is still high, about 46 
percent.  The  reason  of  relatively  slow  declining 
trend in the market concentration may be explained 
by the dominance of the large stateawned hanks in 
the hanking sector. The share of total assets held by 
thc stateawned banks did not changc dramatically 
from 1980 to 1996. In 1996, there were five state- 
owned  commercial banks in  the industry and their 
share in  the total assets was 38%. By observing this 
high  concentration  ratio, one  would think  that the 
Turkish  banking  market  has  an  oligopolistic 
structure. The  numerical  increase  in  the  banking 
sector,  on  the  other  hand,  would  suggest  that 
competitive conditions in the market have increased 
during the 1980s. 
In  short.  the  numerical  increase  in  both  national 
private banks  and  in  foreign banks,  interest  rate 
deregulation, and the introduction of new financial 
products  to  the  market  suggest  that  competitive 
conditions in  the Turkish financial sector increased 
during  the  analyed  period.  Therefore,  it  is 
worthwhile  to  cxamine  whether  the  Turkish 
banking  system  exhibits  characteristics  of 
contestability. To test this. the Rosse-Panzar ( 1977) 
methodology has been used to examine competitive 
conditions in  the  Turkish  banking system and  to 
provide new empirical evidence for the contestable 
market theory.  The model is estimated for a cniss- sectional data set for the year  1983 and the yean  competitive conduct between early 1980s and tb 
between 1988 and 1996. The c
hoi
ce of the period to  lam 1980s and the fimt half of the 1990s. 
study  is determined  by  mainly  the availability of 
data  and to  sea  whcthe~  thae  was  a  chenge  in 
Table 1. The Five-tirm Market Concentration Ratios (CR5) and Number of Ba&s  in the Maht  Between 1988 
and 1996. 
Som:  Turkish Bankem  hsociation 
Note: Tbe  numb^ of banks incMes both cmmmial banks and Iaveshnent & development banks. Total assets, 
total low  and totaf deposits are m U.S.  dollars 
1  Years  I Number of  I Total  1 Total 
THE  ROSSEPANZAR MODEL 
A  test  developed  by  Rossc  and  P~anzar  (1977) 
exsmines the nlatimhip beCwem input priees and 
equilibrium gross mue  daived from  the thmy 
of  t6e  fum Mder  altamtive assumptions about 
cotnpfitive ccmditions. 
Rome and Pam  (1977) applied Sbepha~I's  lemma 
to a firm's profit maximking fmt-orde~  conditions 
to show  that the sum of  the elasticities of reduced 
form revenue function with mpe-et to input  prices 
is  a  mure  of  cwpetitive  dtkms. They 
assume that the analysr has a sarnple of  long-run 
equilibrium observatim8  on finn revenue and input 
prioevectors.Theapprwchistomeawnetheeffect 
of  Wr  prices on observed equilibrium values of 
total revetwe (R').  1f  R'  is observed ~~rme  and 
w,  ,  i  = 1.2, ........  n is the price of the i-th input,  tben 
the test quantity of  H (the Rosse-Pama H statistic) 
is 
In Row  and Patuar (1977) and  Pamsr and  Rosse 
(1987), then are four propositions: 
I)  Under  monopoly equilibrium, the sum of the 
faaor  price  elasticities  of  a  monopolist's 
redd  form  revenue equation must be non- 
positive. 
2)  Under  monopolistic  (CXwnbrlliaian) 
equilimn.  the sum of the elmticities of Ws 
nduoedfonnrevenueswith~tofactor 
prlcesisless~orequaltounity. 
3)  Far lirm in long-run Corrrpettive equilibrium, 
the  sum  of  the  elasticities of  reduced  form 
Ievenw with  respect to  factor pn'ces  Rquals 
unity. 
4)  For  firms in  a stable,  8-c,  imnogam 
product,  conjectural  variation  oligopdly 
equilbriwn,  the  sum  of  the  .facoor  price 
elasticities of rebucal  finn output equation  is 
negative. 
In  order to test  monopolistic competition,  Pam 
and  Ram  (1987)  follow  the  Chamberli 
assumpth regding the  way in  which  a  Ws 
mue  function gets repositid  by m&&  foras 
after rm input price change. For example, the mtry 
and exit of  en  additional  product in  napoase to 
profits and losses will,  m the Long-nm  eqrdlibn'um, 
result m the  finn's perceived demand curve &itling 
m  or  out  until  zem  profits  are  mined.  For 
derivation of  redwed  form  mue  equation and 
the proofs of the -itions  we Pnnza~  and Rome 
(1987). Shaffer  (19x2) was the  first study  to  estimate  the  proportion.  then  we  conclude  that  the  market  is 
reduced  form revenue cquation as a test of market  substantially competitive hut not perfectly so. 
power  in  banking.  Shaffer  uses  the  Rosse-Pamar 
I1 -  storistic, defined as the sum of the elasticity of 
total revenue of firm with respect to the firm's input 
prices  [eq.  (I)],  to  assesses  quantitatively  the  OVERVIEW OF RECENT 
competitive nature of the banking industry.  LITERATURE 
fn short, the Rosse-Panzar test relies on the fact that 
an individual  hank prices differently in response to 
changes  in  its  costs,  in  a  way  that  depends  on 
whether the bank  enjoys some monopoly power or 
instead  is  operating  in  a  competitive  market. 
Various  possible  pricing strategies have definable 
implications  for  changes  in  bank's  grnss revenue 
(Shaffer, 1994). 
If a  bank  has  monopoly  power and sets prices  to 
maximi7e  pmfits,  it  chooses  prices  such  that  its 
gross  revenue  respnds in  the  opposite  direction 
from a change in unit costs. If a market is perfectly 
competitive.  the industry's  gross revenue could rise 
or fall, depending upon  demand  factors,  but bank 
entry  and  exit  would  eventually  force  each 
surviving  bank's  revenue  to  change  in  the  same 
direction as its unit costs. If revenue change is  in 
the same direction as unit costs, but not by the same 
Few researchers have used techniques developed in 
the  contestable  markets  literature  to  analye 
competitive  conditions  in  the hanking sector. The 
studies  reviewed  in  this  section  use  the  Rosse- 
Pamar '  Fl - statistic ' [Rosse  and  Pamar  ( 1977) 
and Pan7ar and Rosse (1987)l to provide a measure 
of  competitive  behavior  of  different  hanking 
sectors. 
Calculation  of  the  H -  statistic is  based  on  the 
properties of the reduced form revenue equations at 
the firm level. Thus.  H  is defined as the sum of the 
factor  price elasticities  of a  firm's  reduced  form 
revenue  equation.  The  data  on  the  revenues  and 
factor  prices  are  the  key  variables  to  test  the 
performance  and  competitive  behavior  of  the 
hanking  markets.  Table  2  displays  various 
interpretations of the H -  storistic. 
Table 2. Interpreting the Panzar-Rosse's H-statistic 
A negative value of H  indicates that the structure 
of  market  is  a  monopoly,  a  perfectly  colluding 
oligopoly,  or  a  conjectural  variations  short-run 
oligopoly. If  H  is negative.  an  increase  in  factor 
prices  increases  marginal  costs  and  reduces 
equilibrium  output.  Because  a  profit-maximizing 
monopoly  never  pushes  its  sales  into  the  range 
where the demand curve is inelastic, an increase in 
factor  prices  leads  to  reduction  in  total  firm 
revenue.  If  H  is equal to one, the structure of the 
market  is  perfectly  competitive.  Therefore.  an 
increase  in  factor  prices  increases  both  marginal 
costs  and  average  costs  without  changing  the 
equilibrium output  level  of an average firm in  the 
sector. 
Source: ~olyneux  et al (1 996) 
The first application of the Panzar and Rosse ( 19x7) 
methodology to the banking  industry is a series of 
cross-sectional  studies  by  Shaffer  (1982)  who 
examines  the competitive  conditions  for a  sample 
of  unit  banks  in  New  York.  Shaffer  (1982) 
estimates  the  reduced  form  revenue  function  of a 
bank.  For  the  competitive  environment  test.  the 
dependent  variable  is  defined  by  total  interest 
revenue. and  it is function of factor prices such as 
the  prices  of labor,  capital,  and  funds.  and  some 
control  variables affecting  long-run equilibrium  of 
bank  revenues.  For  the  equilibrium  test,  the 
dependent variable is defined  as the retum on assets 
(ROA)  and  retum  on  equity  (ROE).  Shaffer 
estimates values of  H  ranging around for 0.32  to 
0.36 for the competitive environment test and 0.30 
and -0.59 for cquilibrium  test  and  concludes that 
Competitive environment test 
If '-  0 
0 < If  c-  I 
FI  = 1 
Equilibrium test 
Monopoly  or  conjectural  variations 
short-run oligopoly 
Monopolistic competition 
Perfect  competition,  or  natural 
monopoly  in  a  perfectly  contestable 
market, or sale maximizing firm subject 
to a breakeven constraint 
/I *  0 
/I = 0 
Disequilibrium 
Equilibrium hanks in  his sample behave neither as monopolists 
nor as  perfectly competitive firms  in  the  long-run 
equilibrium. 
Nathan and Neave (1989) also use the Rosse-Panzar 
methodology to study data  for  Canadian financial 
firms such  as commcrcial banks, trust companies, 
and  mortgage  companies over  the  years  1982  to 
1984. They  use  a  similar  approach as  in  Shaffer 
(1982). Their results for commercial hanks indicate 
that the 1982 value of  H  = 1.058 does not  differ 
significantly from unity, hut the values of  /I -  0.68 
and  /I = 0.729 for the years 1983 and 1984, on the 
other  hand,  are  significantly  different  from  both 
zero  and  unity.  Therefore,  they  reject  both  the 
monopoly  hypothesis  and  (except  in  1982)  the 
hypothesis of perfect competition.  They conclude 
that  banking  revenues  behaves  as  if  they  were 
earned undcr the monopolistic competition. Nathan 
and  Neave's  regression results  for  mortgage  and 
trust companies yield similar results to those of the 
commercial hanks. 
Molyneux et al. (1994) use the same methodology 
to assess competitive conditions in major European 
Community (EC) banking  markets  between  1986 
and  1989.  Their  rcsul&  indicate  that  banks  in 
Germany.  the United Kingdom  France.  and Spain 
eamed  revenues  as  if  monopolistic  competition 
existed  in  the  period. In  Italy, on  the other hand, 
hanks  eamed  revenues  as  if  monopoly  or 
conjectural  variations  short-run  oligopoly 
conditions existed. 
Molyneux  et  al.  (1996)  use  Rosse-Pan7ar 
methodology to  test  for  evidence of contestability 
in  the Japanese banking markets.  Their estimation 
is  based  on  a  cross-section  data  sample  of  72 
Japanese commercial hanks for the years 1986 and 
1988. They present results for both the competitive 
environment and equilibrium test and find that the 
value of  H  range between 4.004 and -0.006 for 
1986. which are both insignificantly different from 
7em and  unity. Thcrefore, this paper  is  unable to 
reject the monopoly or conjectural variations short- 
run oligopoly hypothesis for Japanese commercial 
banks. For 1988, however, the  N values are 0.245 
and 0.423 and they are significantly different from 
both  7ero and  unity.  This  rejects  both  monopoly 
and perfect competition. Thus, the authors conclude 
that  Japanese  banks  earned  revenues as  if  under 
monopolistic competition in  1988.  Their empirical 
findings suggest a change in the market conduct of 
Japanese commercial hanks between I986 and 1988 
THE ECONOMETRIC 
SPECIFICATION, DATA, AND 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We employ the  Rosse-Pamar (1977) methodoloby 
to investigate the competitive conduct of a sample 
of the Turkish commercial hanks for the years 1983 
to 1996. We use a model similar to Shaffer (1992). 
Nathan and Neave ( 1989). Molyneux et al. (1 994). 
and Molynuex et al. (1996). The Rosse-Parvar test 
was  applied  cross  sectionally  on  the  data  for 
Turkish commercial hanks over the years between 
1983 and 1996. The revenue equation is specified 
as follows: 
For the competitive environment test, 
Where: 
In = Natural logarithm 
TR  =  Total  revenue  (interest  income  and  other 
income) 
PL  = Unit  price  of labor  calculated  by dividing 
personnel  expenses  by  the  total  numbers  of 
employees 
PF -  Unit price of funds obtained by dividing total 
interest expenses by total interest bearing liabilities 
PK = Unit price of capital calculated  by dividing 
capital  equipment  and  occupancy  expenses 
including  depreciation,  amortization.  and  rental 
expenses by total fixed assets 
AST -  Total bank assets 
DEP = Total market deposits 
RR  = Number  of  branchedtotal  branches  in  the 
system 
LO = Total loans/total assets 
CAP = Total risk capitaVtotal assets 
u, v = Error terms 
The first three independent variables,  PL.  PF, and 
PK,  are input prices  and the key variables of the 
model. The other control variables are included in 
the  regression  to  account  for  size  and  risk 
characteristics  of banks  in  the  sample  that  could 
affect  the  hank's  long-run  equilibrium  revenues. 
Total assets (AST) are included in the regression to 
control  for possible economies or diseconomies of 
scale  given  the  wide  range  of  asset  sizc  in  the 
sample. The asset six  of banks in our sample varies 
from  8  million  to  16  billion  U.S.  dollars.  The 
relative number of branches (RR) operated by each 
bank  in  the industry is included  as another proxy 
for bank size. Total market deposit (DEP) is entered 
as  an  independent  variable  to  control  aggregate local demand for banking services.  As in the other 
models [except for Nathan and Neave (1989)], the 
dependent variable,  total revenue (TR), is not risk- 
adjusted.  The degree of risk  taking  by  banks also 
may affect the revenue.  But risk-taking behavior  is 
a difficult amibute to measure. There is  no single 
best  measure  and  all  indicators  of  risk-taking 
behavior are subject to data availability. Therefore, 
to  account  for  firn-specific risk,  we  include  two 
firn-specific risk variables loan to assets ratio (LO) 
and  risk  capital  to  assets  ratio  (CAP),  as  in 
Molynuex et al. (1994) in our regression. 
To  test  whether  observations  are  in  the  long-run 
equilibrium,  Shaffer  (1982)  related  the  return  on 
asset  (ROA)  to  input  prices.  The  model  assumes 
that all observations are in long-run equilibrium.  In 
equilibrium,  the  rate  of  return  should  not  be 
statistically correlated with input prices (Molyneux 
et al.,  1994 and Nathan  and Neave, 1989).  If  the 
market, on the other hand, is in disequilibrium, an 
increase  in  factor  prices  would  be  reflected  in  a 
temporary decrease in  the rate  of return,  and vice 
versa. Thus, a value of H < 0  is taken  to mean a 
state  of  disequilibrium,  whereas  H = 0  indicate 
that  the  system  is  in  equilibrium.  We  use  the 
following  equation  to  examine  whether 
observations are indeed in the long-run equilibrium. 
For the equilibrium test, 
Under  these  specifications,  H -  statistic  is 
H = P, + Pp,  + p,,  ix., the sum of the factor price 
elasticities. 
Data 
The  data  for  this  study  were  obtained  from  the 
annual balance sheets and income statement reports 
from  commercial  banks  operating  in  the  Turkish 
banking  industry  over  the  years  1983  to  1996. 
Those  reports  were  obtained  from  the  Turkish 
Bankers Association. The model is estimated  for a 
cross-sectional data set. 
Empirical Results 
data, we test whether the errors are homoscedastic 
in  our  model.  To  investigate  this,  we  used  the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis 
of homoscedastic  errors  is  rejected  for  the  years 
1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, and  1996. Therefore,  we 
used  the  White (1980) estimator  for  the  variance 
matrix to correct the standard errors. The results of 
the estimations are presented in Tables 3-6. As seen 
in  Table 3 and 4, the  R2  'S  take very high values, 
which is a sign of better fit. 
Since  the  assumption  of  homoscedastic  residual 
variance  is  often  violated  in  the  cross-sectional PL -  Pris  of  labor 
P F = Price of  fimds 
PK  = F'ricc  of  capital 
AST=Toralae& 
DEP =  Total wits 
BR *  Relative branch 
LO = Total hanW  assets ratio 
CAP -  CapiWtal asset6 ratio *,  **, ***  dam8 si~~  levd at 1%.  5%  and 10% &vely. 
T-statistics are ia tbe  parentheses 
The sign on the  dcients  fa  the key variables, 
price of labor (Pt), price of fun&r (PF),  and ppiee of 
cepital  (F'K),  are  almost  always  positive  and 
statistically significant for all  years except for 1983. 
In the case of other contml variables, the sim  on 
asset  size  (AST)  and  relative  branches  (BR) 
coefficients  are positive and statistically significant 
fa  all  years,  indicating  that  siz.-induced 
differences between Lmh may lead to higher total 
revenue.  Themfore,  the  regmaions indicate  that 
total wets  and relatiye bmncbes appesr to capture 
size effect in the  modeL The  aim  of the coefficicient 
for  ttU: total  Wts  {DEP)  is  positive  for  soole 
yeawand~efmM,butitisWWy 
mai&fimt  m nus$ case% The lam to asset &  is 
negatively rellded to  ll?%nue,  implying that banks 
with a higher proportion of loans in their dlios 
rpe tilrely to have  Icra%r revenue than similar bsnlrs 
with  smallex  ratio&  Thw dta  mdicpte  tbat 
ldmgisarisky~.  Thecapitaltonssefwtio 
IS,  on  the 0th  had, posia'vely relsted m reverme, 
implying  &at  banlrs wth  a  bigha  ratio  of  risk 
capitill an: likely to have hi&m  revermc. Table 5 
and 6 preseot the qgrmirn mlts  for the lag-nm 
equilibrium canditim. Table 5. Parameter Estimatcs and Test Statistics for the Rosse-Parvar Test of Long-Run Equilibrium Between 
19x8-1992 
*.  *',  ***denote significance lcvel at 1%. 5%. and IF?  respectively. T-statistics are in the parentheses 


















































- The  mlculated  H -  s&&n'w  for  campti* 
-t  test and the long-MI equilibtium twq 
which  use  fhe return  on  ass&  (ROA)  as  the 
dLpeadent variable, iue  presd  in Table  7 for 
each  year  in  the sample  pniod.  The ~~ 
vahm of  br h  long-m equilibrium test  are 
not sfat-iatically diffennt from zm.  Thus, the long- 
run equilibrium midition am  to be atablishad 
in  each  of  the  ten  years  nnd  therefme,  the 
H -  s&Itrn'm can  be mingfitlly in-. 
Table 7.  Comve  Position and Equilibrium Tests for the Tmkish Comtmmal Bsnlrs Betweat 1983-1996 
As shown in Table 7, fcr 1983,  the  H value of - 
0288, vhlcb is SCatMIy  diffezmt from  both m 
and unity at fntspaoRtt level. Ilrua,  we rue  dle 
to  reject  the  monopoly  or  conjechrral  variations 
&art-nm  oliiiy  for  the  Tmfrish 
commercial banks. 
snd 19%. on the other hand, 
the  H  -  star&n'cs for the cmp&tive  emirom& 
tes!  a  positive and are  atatistjcally diffe~nt  from 
both  ~ao  and  unity  at  leesr  at  the fivc-pacent 
levels. This  resuJt njmtb the  monapcly hypothesis 
(H=l) and  pe&%ct  mmtpetition  hypothesis 
I 
1996 
(H  =O ).  TurMsh  camnemal  banking  revenues 
behave  as  if  th~y  were  tarn&  tmdcr  the 
moaopllistk  ccmpetitloa  for  dl yrsrs betwem 
1988 and 1996.  7bis  rewtlt is  coa8ktent with  the 
contatabie markt themy. FimllyY  the data indicate 
that  there  were  chaw in  the  competitive 
canditions between early 1980s and late 1980s and 
the first half of 1990s 
One Eould cugue  that the Turkish commemhl hanlrs 
could  maeh market  powe+ becaw  of  high 
cempetitivt  J?mbmmt 
Test 
H =  the  9om  of elasticities of redud  fmm mveme frmction witb respect to input prices, (H  = j3, + Pz + 63). 
F  I = F4stjc  for testing the bypoWi  H  = 0. 
F2=F-sa\tisticforteseingthehyp~H=  1. 
* dmotea significance lwel at 5% 
F2 = 57.00* 
H -  0.703 
F1= 67.15" 
n-  IZ.II* 
EqrulibriumTm 
H  =  -0.122 
F1 =  0.76 concentration  impairing  competitiveness  in  the 
banking  market.  The  empirical  findings  of  this 
papcr  indicate  that  even  though  Turkish  banking 
system  is  dominated  by  large  state-owned  and 
private  banks,  revenues  were  eamed  as  if  the 
industry was monopolistically competitive hetween 
1988 and 1996. Therefore, the empirical results are 
consistent  with  the  theory  of  contestability that 
market  structure  is  determined  by  industry 
characteristics. The financial liberali-ration program 
in  early  1980s  could  he  an  explanation  for  the 
change in the market conduct. Opening the banking 
markets  for  new  entrants.  particularly  foreign 
banks,  were  the  most  important  element  of  the 
competition.  Since  1980,  the  number  of  foreign 
banks operating in Turkey has increased from 4 to 
20. Total numbers of banks. on the other hand,  has 
increased  from  43  to  69.  From  our  empirical 
findings  one  can  conclude  that  this  numerical 
increase  in  the  market  has  changed  the  market 
conduct. 
Finally, the empirical results of this paper support 
recent  research  by  Nathan  and  Neave  (1989). 
Molyneux et al. (1994), and Molyneux et al. (1996) 
that a high degree of competition is possible even in 
structurally concentrated banking markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates empirically the competitive 
conditions  of the  Turkish  banking  sector  for  the 
years  1983  to  1996  by  applying  a  new  method 
previously  applied  to  the  U.S.  and  Canadian 
banking industries. The Rosse and  Pam  test has 
been  performed  to  test  the  contestability of  the 
banking.  The  empirical  findings  of  our  study 
suggest  that  the  banking  market  in  Turkey  was 
neither  monopolistic  nor  perfectly  competitive 
between  1988  and  1996.  Therefore,  banking 
revenues behave as if they were  earned under the 
monopolistic competition. Our results also indicate 
that  the  commercial  banking  in  1983  earned 
revenues  under  the  monopoly  or  conjectural 
variations  short-run  oligopoly.  Thus,  the  market 
conduct  of  Turkish  commercial  banks  between 
1983  and  1988-1996  changed.  Recause  of 
deregulation, the most restrictions on market entry, 
interest rates. and exchange rates were eliminated in 
the  early  1980s.  Today.  there  are  only  a  few 
restrictions on market entry.  leaving relatively free 
access for entry by new hanks. particularly foreign 
banks. Empirical estimation confirms the effects of 
recent  policy  changes.  Thus.  by  looking  at 
concentration ratios. one cannot reach a conclusion 
about market conduct. 
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